Anzac Frigate Replacement: The option of least regret
New Zealand should choose the frigate option that maximises utility, adaptability and availability over next three decades, writes Jim Gilmour.
As New Zealand reflects on its commitment to Defence through the lens of recent criticism from United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, it does so as the country anticipates one of the most consequential defence acquisitions since the replacement of the Leander Class frigates in the 1990s. The first tranche of New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) Maritime Fleet Renewal considers replacement of its two Anzac class frigates.
The New Zealand Government has announced that the British Inspiration class Type 31 and Japanese Mogami class frigates would be compared allowing Cabinet to consider recommendations late in 2027. The first ship delivery is expected towards the middle of the next decade.
New Zealand’s defence spending debate allows reflection upon how meaningful investment in defence is measured and for some, whether defence should be funded at all.
New Zealand’s Defence Force (NZDF) is a national contingent capability and is analogous to an insurance policy. In many ways, this concept explains the challenge in describing the value proposition of a defence force. At some level, reducing worry about future unwelcome events lies at the core of why a government exists. Investment on these terms is a hard sell when cash is tight. An effective insurance policy, like a national security investment, is not measured by how much it costs but the cover it provides most economically.
“The question for New Zealand’s Cabinet in 2028 must not be which frigate might be narrowly better on paper when it is introduced to service. The decision should reflect which option would lead to the least regret in 2050 and every year until then.“
As New Zealand’s Defence Minister Chris Penk inferred when discussing uncrewed capabilities in post budget remarks, New Zealand’s government will be alive to opportunities to maximise “…bangs for bucks”. It should remind those who are entrusted to buy capabilities for the NZDF that all spending of public money must be defendable. Further, those decisions should be defendable throughout the life of the capability, as often, deviations from ‘ideal’ have tended to be normalised or tolerated quietly rather than learned from.
As former United States Secretary of Defence, General Jim Mattis noted in his biographical Callsign Chaos, “A leader’s responsibility is to ensure that when the nation faces its next crisis, it does so with as few regrets as possible”. A mistake now would condemn New Zealand to regretting its decision for decades given the expected price tag for this part of its security insurance policy – and New Zealand has form in this area.
The decision to follow Australia with acquisition of the Meko (ANZAC) class ships in the 1990s was worthy of regret from the beginning as a decision to afford only two ships due to cost resulted in very poor availability over the next three decades. Further regret followed as New Zealand elected to not follow the Australian upgrade path due its cost which effectively condemned the NZDF to maintain and operate an orphan fleet of two complex warships.
There are other strong candidates for regret in recent capability decisions – 105 Light Armoured Vehicles (the enormous expense contributed to other capabilities being unaffordable), disbandment of the Air Combat Capability (a sought after coalition capability retired), Mobile Field Hospital (never effectively set to work), HMNZS Charles Upham (poor ambition and follow through failure). There are others and naturally some readers may dispute this sample of ‘poor decisions’, but should agree that the test in its simplest terms would be – if New Zealand could make these decisions again with the benefit of hindsight– would they?
So, how can New Zealand protect its next decision from future regret? What should New Zealand be getting ready for? Whilst the future is unknowable, it must be the duty of decision makers to attempt to imagine it.
Whilst some effort has been made within New Zealand’s security sector to develop an aggregated view of the future threat landscape, it has struggled to gain traction. A mature repeatable, consultative ‘think tank’ approach to New Zealand’s security is needed as an adjunct to Defence’s existing policy development processes however, evidence of its existence cannot be drawn from recent acquisition decisions or the recent Defence Capability Plan itself.
What the future holds might be mysterious but helpfully the capability decision makers are able to review NZDF outputs over many years and generate a list of most used attributes including the Royal New Zealand Navy’s (RNZN) contribution to those outputs. This knowledge would logically form the foundations of what the renewed Fleet would be expected to be doing most frequently, and availability of those capabilities will be crucial in the future.
Futurists could reasonably expect New Zealand’s future fleet to be called upon to conduct the following types of operations in the coming decades: surveillance, patrol, interdiction, search and rescue, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief – both domestically and regionally, regional resilience and security operations, support to other government agencies (Department of Conservation, Antarctic New Zealand, Ministry of Primary Industries, Police, Customs, and others), support to important security partners, especially New Zealand’s only formal ally Australia, support to the International Rule of Law (United Nations and Combined Maritime Force operations) and ‘at sea training’. These outputs are delivered in an unforgiving maritime environment which is hard on equipment and people.
The list is not exhaustive, but it paints a picture that might drive decisions towards a fleet that is made up of many ship types for nations with the buying power to afford them. Australia is such a nation where patrol, disaster relief, projection of forces, above and below water combat, and other maritime outputs are delivered by specialised capabilities. As an example, Australia will be operating two types of frigates to deliver different sub-specialities.
New Zealand has a different affordability reality where sensible acquisitions must be able to contribute to the wider responsibilities of the Defence Force including ‘at sea’ training. These attributes must be satisfied before considering what the threat seascape might be in 2035 and beyond.
Alignment with Australia dominates conversations around New Zealand’s frigate decision. Often, ‘interoperability with Australia’ is confused with ‘same as Australia’ which is unhelpful. Complimentary capabilities that are interoperable with New Zealand’s defence and security partners makes sense and, importantly, provides an operational point of difference that will be more useful than two or three more ships of a capability Australia is already operating.
Interoperability goes to such features as communications, data sharing, helicopter and boat employment to name a few – there is little interoperability imperative to having the same ship.
So, what questions should inform New Zealand’s decision? Utility, adaptability and availability would be useful lines of inquiry – what it can do, what else might it do in the future and how dependably available will the ships be?
As the future can only be imagined, it makes sense to equip New Zealand’s Defence Force with capabilities with room to grow where possible. For ships this means provision of space, weight, propulsion, cooling, secure spaces and if possible, plug and play capabilities that can be adapted as the threats evolve.
A frigate is a combat vessel and therefore must first be a credible combat vessel. New Zealand will not purchase a ship type that cannot contribute to medium intensity combat operations and survive. The key comparison is whether one option’s marginal advantages in this area should outweigh deficiencies in adaptability and utility over the next 30 years.
A comparison of publicly available data between the Type 31 and Mogami classes is instructive. Whilst the Mogami option brings marginally superior combat credentials in certain areas, it does so with a catalogue of limitations, particularly in terms of utility and adaptability. These include very limited ability to embark personnel beyond the crew, severely limited training capacity, limited space for uncrewed systems, disaster relief stores, mission bays and little growth margin allows for very limited capability breadth beyond its combat functions.
This places the Mogami Frigate at a significant disadvantage. Whilst the Mogami’s specialised utility set may be an ideal addition to Australia’s fleet, it will not meet New Zealand’s long-term needs.
History suggests that by 2050 the RNZN is likely to have spent more time over the preceding 25 years conducting regional partner operations, maritime security operations, disaster relief, hosting specialist teams, delivering training and integrating emerging technologies than near peer combat operations – irrespective of current geopolitical trends. A ship that can meaningfully contribute to the Navy’s most called upon outputs whilst being ready for combat operations when required will represent the most “bangs for bucks”.
The Type 31, an ‘in service’ credible combat frigate, brings significant adaptable onboard space for additional sea boats, uncrewed vehicle operations, embarked forces, disaster relief equipment and stores, trainees and future capabilities yet to be imagined. It will support these important aspects whilst additionally being an impressive warfighting ship.
Total cost of ownership may have an influence on the Cabinet decision although material differences in price between the two options have yet to be revealed. Notwithstanding, New Zealand can only realistically afford a small number of combatant ships. It is therefore crucial that those platforms can perform as many different tasks as is sensible. The Type 31 is a superior multi-role sovereign combat asset compared with Mogami.
The question for New Zealand’s Cabinet in 2028 must not be which frigate might be narrowly better on paper when it is introduced to service. The decision should reflect which option would lead to the least regret in 2050 and every year until then.
New Zealand arguably has experienced buyer’s regret in the past when it has prioritised affordability or bespoke capability attributes over adaptability. Such decisions have led to generational liabilities that have sapped resources, availability, readiness and operational effectiveness. Rather than tailoring its fleet to today’s challenges, New Zealand’s ships need to be capable of adapting to emerging threats, disruptive technologies and missions.
The Type 31 will be a stronger addition to New Zealand’s fleet than the Mogami on the day it enters service due to space and weight, but its strongest advantage is what it can do and carry in the future. In an uncertain world – growth margin is the surest insurance policy against future regret.
An unashamed plug for Type-31 after the first few paragraphs. The only “combat” our ANZACs have been called on was ASW and anti piracy, and combat ships must prioritise combat as their primary function with their secondary functions being literally secondary. Type-31 doesn’t do ASW so its a failure out of the gate. Both are designed to support USV operations through substantial mission bays, so the question for me is “what will ASW look like in the future” as some capabilities evolve to make use of USVs and UUVs. Neither ship is especially quiet but New Mogami appears to be a closer match to how we intend to use them.
Thanks for your comment Dwayne. The article reflects a capability option balance, that I am arguing, better fits New Zealand’s operational problem set and budget. We could debate your assertion that ASW and anti-piracy was the only ‘combat’ that the ANZACs have been called upon, but if that were true, the question might be – “what material advantage did their hull-mounted sonar bring to that ASW problem?” Better by far to detect and fight a submarine at distance from the task group. Theatre ASW is brought about by a system of systems – intelligence, orbital surveillance systems, maritime patrol aircraft, towed array sonar, helicopters, dipping sonar, sonar buoys, acoustic processing, aerial weapon delivery etc. The Type 31 with towed array sonar, MH60R helicopter (with dipping sonar and sonar buoys), an air weapons magazine and extensive adaptable space for what the future brings is a formidable ASW capability. In terms of capability breadth, the Mogami and Type 31 both have space for fixed systems but only the T31 brings dedicated adaptable mission bays (6 x 20 foot ISO container space). Space that will be needed to pivot toward future emerging operational requirements.