A Bias for Action: Critiquing the NZ First Defence Policy
NZ First’s “Defence, Security and Protection of the Realm” white paper is ambitious, but it raises questions, writes Graeme Doull.
Defence rarely gets the attention it deserves during New Zealand election campaigns. It is refreshing to see New Zealand First publish a dedicated defence policy ahead of the election, putting its proposals before voters for scrutiny.
NZ First’s Defence, Security and Protection of the Realm white paper, authored by former Defence Minister Ron Mark, is an ambitious document. It recognises the deteriorating state of our military and proposes a number of worthwhile measures to rebuild capability. There is plenty to welcome, but also some questions that need answering.
The Good: Acknowledging the Crisis
The greatest strength of the policy is that it refuses to ignore the current state of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). It is blunt about the state of a force that turns away willing recruits while losing Tier-1 operators to private security and foreign militaries.
“New Zealand has allowed its military capabilities to erode while the strategic environment has become more demanding. We should heed the lessons of history and invest in defence now, rather than risk facing far greater costs later.“
Strategically, the policy hits the right notes. It addresses sovereign security, regional stability, and our international partnerships. Its attention to the Pacific, the vulnerability of undersea cables, and the protection of our resources demonstrates a clear understanding of the contemporary threat environment.
Crucially, the policy is forward-looking. Rather than remaining entrenched in legacy thinking, it focuses on modern capability and cutting overhead, and it takes Ukraine’s experience seriously. Uncrewed systems, precision fires, and modular platforms are exactly where a modern, agile force should focus.
NZ First also shows a bias for action. A minister-appointed review panel tasked with delivering an implementation plan within 90 days is a sensible way to cut through bureaucratic resistance. The proposed measures extend beyond organisational reform to include 180-day war reserves; standby contracts with domestic industry; and a direct exchange with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence. The signal is clear: more investment, greater self-reliance, and a renewed warfighting focus.
Ambition versus Reality
For all its strengths, several elements demand further consideration.
First is the preoccupation with pay at the top. The paper would remove military appointments from Public Service Commission oversight – which is a positive – but it imposes pay cuts and caps senior executive pay at 3.5 times a Command Warrant Officer First Class’s base pay. Support for pay increases is welcome, but cutting senior leadership pay is a curious retention strategy.
Then there is the proposed New Zealand Marine Force: a Commando Regiment of 800 to 1,200 personnel, built around UK Royal Marine Commando doctrine and permanently embarked on sealift and modular vessels. New Zealand already struggles to maintain the numbers required for its special forces. Will it be possible to recruit a further 1,200 personnel of sufficient calibre to establish an elite commando regiment? Could this role instead be filled by repurposing regular army infantry for amphibious operations, creating a force more aligned to the United States Marine Corps than a specialist commando unit?
Capability-wise, the call for a second multi-role ship to complement HMNZS Canterbury is highly commendable. However, maritime mathematics cannot be ignored. To sustain forces in the Pacific and a permanently embarked Marine force, two hulls are not enough. To sustain two vessels continuously available for operations, allowing for maintenance, refits, training and other periods of unavailability, New Zealand would need a fleet of six to eight multi-role vessels.
While the policy addresses some aspects of resilience, such as the 180-day war reserves and domestic standby contracts, it says much less about the organisational resilience needed to sustain combat power over time. The Army, much like the Navy’s multi-role ships above, needs a force structure that supports sustainable rotation: preparing, deploying and reconstituting units.
Finally, there are tensions and gaps. The paper highlights that Australia is our “sole formal ally” and promises “complete integration,” but says little about aligning equipment, doctrine and procurement. An ANZAC manufacturing base is a good start, but surely including South Korean and Japanese suppliers, given their industrial capacity and geographic proximity, makes sense too?
Defence Needs More Political Attention
The current era has uncomfortable parallels with the inter-war period of the 1920s and 30s. New Zealand has allowed its military capabilities to erode while the strategic environment has become more demanding. We should heed the lessons of history and invest in defence now, rather than risk facing far greater costs later.
The consequences are not abstract. Sending NZDF personnel into operations without the protection, equipment and support needed to survive and fight on the modern battlefield puts their lives at risk. The experience of New Zealand forces in Greece and Crete in 1941 is a stark reminder of the cost of committing troops who are outmatched and inadequately equipped.
A regional crisis may develop gradually and then escalate suddenly. New Zealand will have to respond with the tools it has at the time. A weakened NZDF leaves us with fewer options, constrains our ability to support Pacific neighbours, and limits our capacity to defend our own interests.
NZ First deserves credit for putting forward a dedicated defence policy with a clear sense of urgency. This urgency must be matched by credible priorities and a realistic plan to generate and sustain combat power.
