Left or Right: Frigate decision will come down to ideology
With major decisions on fleet replacement unlikely until late 2027, they’ll depend on who wins November’s election, writes Wayne Mapp.
Defence has not been a policy area of any note in the upcoming election. However, the changing balance of power in the world is shaping the defence policies of the political parties. This is probably more significant with the Left bloc of parties compared to the Right.
The international trends are two-fold; one long term, the other short term. Each of these are shaping the approach of how New Zealand’s political parties’ approach foreign policy and security issues.
The long run trend has undoubtedly been the rise of China. While the rise of China has general international significance, it is particularly pertinent in the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand, as a Pacific nation, takes an intense interest in the evolution of the balance of power between China and the United States.
As a general rule, New Zealand attempts to strike a balance in its relationships with China and the United States. However, since the United States and Australia are New Zealand’s predominant security partners, New Zealand takes more notice of their expectations in the security arena than it does of China’s expectations.
“Choosing the Mogami will inevitably require a larger budget. In contrast, the Arrowhead 140 would be more likely chosen if there is a financial need to reduce the level of combat capability of the ANZAC replacement. “
There are, however, indications, particularly among the Left bloc of parties, that New Zealand should extend its balanced view of international relations into the security area. If the incoming government is made up of the Left bloc, they will soon find out how viable such an approach actually is.
The short-term trend is wrapped up in the incumbent in the White House. President Trump has forcefully advocated American primacy and expects allies and partners to defer to United States leadership.
In the first 12 months of his current term , he was notably successful. Allies and partners have made significant commitments to substantially increase their defence expenditure, though there are exceptions. Spain has not yielded to United States pressure in this regard.
More recently, since the United States Iran war, United States allies and partners are taking a more independent approach to their security interests. European nations know that they must take the key decisions affecting their own security.
It is noteworthy that Australia is much less interested than the Europeans in taking such an independent approach. In contrast, Australia’s objective is to more tightly bind the United States into a deeper defence partnership. This is irrespective of any specific United States administration, so this approach has continued during the Trump administration.
In early September 2026, Australian Defence Minister Marles met with his counterpart, Secretary Hegseth, in Washington. The United States stated that it intended to continue to build up its forces in Australia. Using the NATO measure, Minister Marles emphasised that Australian defence spending had reached 2.8% of GDP. This is more than twice that of New Zealand.
Given that Australia is New Zealand’s only formal defence ally, the ongoing buildup in Australia, both of United States commitments and of Australian spending, will inevitably impact on New Zealand’s choices.
In New Zealand there is an expanding divergence between the Left and Right Blocs. During the Trump era, some of this is to be expected.
Opposition parties will always have easier choices since their statements have no direct government consequence. All of them have forcefully opposed United States actions in respect of the Iran war. The most left wing, the Green Party and Te Pati Maori, advocate fully disconnecting from all aspects of the Western alliance, at least as it affects the United States. They tend not to comment on New Zealand’s formal alliance with Australia.
Labour is more mindful of long-standing defence commitments, such as New Zealand’s membership of the Five Eyes intelligence arrangements. They will be much more aware of the nuances of the relationship with Australia than would be their likely coalition partners.
The coalition government has been more circumspect than the opposition parties, though even they have become a little more forthright as the Iran war has progressed. As government, they are much more aware that within the life of the next New Zealand government, they will be dealing with a post Trump administration. Defence decisions have a time frame typically measured in multiple decades and thus are more influenced by long terms trends rather than short term expediency.
In 2025, the government produced the Defence Capability Plan (DCP), which set out likely purchases and allocated at least some of the money that would be required to fund them.
Notably, the most expensive part, the replacement of the naval fleet, remains unfunded. The coalition has made it clear that the major decisions on the naval fleet replacement won’t be made until late 2027.
The indication is that for the frigate replacement, the choice will be between the Mogami frigate and the Arrowhead 140. Both will involve at least $5 billion for a one for one replacement for a force of two ships. If finance becomes the primary forcing factor, the Arrowhead 140 may have the advantage in that it can more readily be configured with a variety of combat capability options, including being very lightly armed.
The coalition government has indicated that defence spending will rise to 2% of GDP by the early 2030s. However, they have not provided a spending track that will lead to that outcome. Given competing budgetary priorities, it will be a challenge to reach the stated goal of 2% of GDP.
The choice of frigate will have a major impact on the ultimate size of the defence budget. Choosing the Mogami will inevitably require a larger budget. In contrast, the Arrowhead 140 would be more likely chosen if there is a financial need to reduce the level of combat capability of the ANZAC replacement.
So far as the opposition is concerned, it seems highly unlikely that defence spending will increase to 2% of GDP. A lightly armed version of the Arrowhead 140 would probably allow defence spending to remain with a 1.5% envelope. Two, perhaps three such lightly armed ships may be seen as appropriate replacements for both the ANZAC frigates and the two Offshore Patrol Vessels.
Lightly armed ships would go some way to meeting the requirements of Labour’s likely coalition partners, given their view that the primary purpose of defence is peacekeeping, HADR, and environmental monitoring within the South Pacific.
Although the world seems more uncertain than in recent decades, this has not come to the fore in the election campaign. However, the international environment is flavouring the defence and security choices that the two major political blocs are making. The divergence between Left and Right is perhaps greater than at any time since the nuclear-free choice of the 1984 election.
