Why artillery should manage battlefield drones
FPV drones are no longer being dispersed across the force, They’re delivering surveillance and indirect fire effects, writes Ben Morgan.
On Ukraine’s frontline, 70-80% of casualties are now caused by drones. Most by simple, easily produced First Person View (FPV) drones that any adversary with access to an electronics store and explosives can build. Simple, easily built, FPV drones provide new surveillance and strike capabilities that are re-shaping land tactics.
In Ukraine, vast numbers of FPV drones circle over the frontline so any vehicle or group of soldiers moving in the open is immediately spotted and engaged. This limits the ability to manoeuvre, forcing both sides to look for new tactics, including new force structures and command relationships for FPV drones.
Russia and Ukraine are both centralising command and control (C2) of their FPV drones. In both armies, FPV drones and their operators are being consolidated into large units like Ukraine’s Magyars Birds or Russia’s Rubicon.
It’s a development designed to break the frontline stalemate because FPV drones (and the best operators) can be concentrated at the point of main effort. Concentration also simplifies support arrangements with other assets like maintainers, suppliers, surveillance drones, electronic warfare units, cyber experts and intelligence analysts.
“Rather than trying to ‘re-invent the wheel’ or viewing FPV drones as ‘small helicopters’ dispersed across the force, it makes sense to centralise these resources and take an ‘effects-based’ approach to their management.“
Russia and Ukraine are creating units and C2 arrangements that can create ‘mass effects’. An ‘effect’ is the impact imposed upon the enemy. For example, FPV drones provide a range of effects that includes surveillance, target acquisition or the delivery of direct or indirect fire effects, such as neutralising, suppressing or destroying enemy positions.
What does ‘massed effect’ mean?
In simple terms, using more FPV drones increases the ‘effect’ imposed on the enemy through concentration of force. A platoon in defence, for example, will be more greatly impacted upon as a result of an attack by 100 FPV drones compared to an attack by ten. By similar logic, allocating 100 FPV drones to a surveillance task will deliver better coverage than ten.
Before drones, artillery was the arm that provided the best example of ‘mass effect’ because the fire of any gun or rocket within range can be rapidly concentrated on a target. Essentially, an artillery unit can transfer an ‘effect’ like suppression, neutralisation, or destruction immediately around the battlefield. When multiple artillery units are operating together their ‘effects’ can be massed for great impact on the enemy.
Russia and Ukraine’s drone doctrine emphasises ‘mass effect’
Fighting near Dnipropetrovsk early in 2026, Ukrainian forces demonstrated ‘massed effect’ with FPV drones in offensive operations, using massed formations (or swarms) of drones to create ‘creeping barrages’ or ‘cascades’ of FPV drones to neutralise or suppress enemy positions ahead of advancing infantry. Massed FPV drones meant the attacking force advanced behind a supporting barrage of indirect fire, a tactic familiar to generations of gunners. The Preston Stewart YouTube channel provides good analysis of these tactics.
The Two Marines’ Substack provides another useful analysis of how Russia is concentrating drone C2 to create ‘massed effect.’ The article discusses Russian experiments with a C2 concept called a ‘Drone Line’. It observes that the concept “was an attempt to more systematically organize strike UAS [Uncrewed Aerial Systems] assets in support of offensive operations instead of having each regiment or brigade’s UAS assets focus on its own area of responsibility.”
Like their Ukrainian counterparts, Russian planners acknowledge there is benefit in concentration of drone effects through centralised C2 arrangements.
The ‘small helicopter model’ is gone. It evolved into defensive ‘kill webs’
This is a notable change in FPV drone use. Early in the war they were deployed in an ad hoc local fashion, essentially operating as ‘small helicopters’ for a unit. Initially, FPV drones provided a view ‘over the hill’ and were deployed as spotters for mortars and artillery. The next evolution was attack FPV drones that either dropped munitions or crashed kamikaze-style into targets.
We then witnessed the development of drone-based defensive kill webs over the front Iine. Modern digital communication networks allowed the ‘sensors’ that locate targets – like drones and soldiers – to instantaneously share information with ‘shooters’ – like missiles, artillery, aircraft, drones and tanks – enabling immediate, accurate engagement. The ‘sensor-shooter’ relationship froze movement on the battlefield because any vehicle or group of soldiers could be spotted and engaged.
C2 arrangements and technology to support massed drone effects
Now we can observe the next phase of FPV drone evolution. The maturation of C2 systems for FPV drones that allow for massive concentrations of FPV drones. Russia and Ukraine have both consolidated large number of drones and drone operators into large units like Ukraine’s Magyars Birds or Russia’s Rubicon.
This organisational change allows FPV drones and the best operators to be concentrated at the point of main effort. Alongside logistics and other supporting assets like maintainers, surveillance drones, electronic warfare units, cyber experts and intelligence analysts. A development designed to break the frontline stalemate by creating the ability to mass drone effects at a key point on the battlefield.
It also constitutes a transition in thinking about how FPV drones are used. Ukraine and Russia have transitioned from the ‘small helicopter’ model of drones supporting infantry companies or platoon-sized units towards building the infrastructure for ‘massed effects.’
The next evolution will involve the utilisation of artificial intelligence (AI) for coordination of drones, enhancing a force’s ability to pilot large numbers of drones either within an attack swarm or ‘on post’ maintaining surveillance – activities that currently require human pilots flying individual drones.
Discussing Ukrainian drone innovations and the use of AI, Patrick Tucker recently commented in Defence One that “future drone operations may not require highly trained drone pilots, just regular soldiers who can outline basic mission parameters. The swarm, sharing and analyzing data as a group, would figure out the hard stuff.”
Already, there are reports of AI being used this way but they are not corroborated. Nevertheless, it is likely only a matter of time before this is confirmed.
A feature of Ukraine’s tactical success is the Kropyva computerised tactical information and fire control system. The system, which is essentially an Android app, was developed around 2014-16, and is maturing in service.
Kropyva maps where friendly and enemy forces are and allows units to transfer information about their situation to each other digitally. This means that tactical information can be shared immediately and accurately between vehicles, or between units.
The app also integrates drones and ballistic calculations. For instance, drone footage can be shared instantly with a tank, a mortar detachment or an artillery battery that receives not just information about the target, but also the ballistic data to immediately engage the target.
It is easy to see a future in which fire control apps, linked to centralised drone swarms enabled by AI, will simplify the use of massed drone ‘effects’ on the battlefield. Frontline soldiers could use an app to ‘call forward’ the support they need from drone units located behind the frontline.
Such a capability would reduce the need for frontline units to operate and maintain large numbers of FPV drones. In the event that resources are required, apps like Kropyva would allow them to be easily drawn forwards. This reduces logistical and management stress on small unit command chains.
Likewise, if resources are required elsewhere, they could be quickly moved to other points on the battlefield because, like artillery fire, FPV drone effort can easily be switched to another area.
But militaries struggle to adapt
Unfortunately, militaries around the world tend to behave conservatively and are slow to adapt to change. Last year, for instance, several NATO armies received an important ‘wake up’ call during Estonia’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025. The exercise was a large wargame pitting approximately 16,000 NATO soldiers against a ‘live’ enemy.
RBC-Ukraine reported Estonia’s head of drone systems Arbo Probal as saying “…the exercise simulated a “contested and congested” battlefield designed to maximize stress and cognitive overload for units, testing their adaptability. Exercise Hedgehog’s aim was to break Estonia and its allies’ battlegroups and thereby demonstrate areas of weakness.”
According to media reports and commentators, the exercise succeeded in its aim, with NATO’s battle groups quickly ‘defeated’ by a relatively small force of Ukrainian drones.
RBC-Ukraine reported that the Ukrainian-led opposition force deployed a density of roughly 30 drones per 10 square kilometres, about half the current density on the frontline. Yet, even with this low concentration of drones the effect was lethal. Any unconcealed movement was immediately identified and engaged. “The attackers quickly ‘eliminated’ two entire battalions and rendered the NATO force incapable of battle,” reported the Centre for European Policy Analysis.
This exercise could indicate that NATO forces are still thinking of drones as ‘small helicopters’ deployed in a de-centralised manner to support frontline units rather than in terms of their ability to deliver ‘massed effect’. This resulted in a failure to appreciate their adversary’s ability to saturate an area with surveillance to locate targets and then to swarm attack drones in overwhelming force.
Now Pacific militaries have an opportunity to adapt
Pacific militaries are fortunate in that they have an opportunity to learn from this experience and build C2 and force structures to manage and maximise the ‘effects’ of FPV drones.
In my opinion, the key elements of a successful force structure to manage FPV drones in the land domain are that C2 and logistics need to be centrally managed.
Tactically, centralising C2 allows for FPV drones to be used en masse to concentrate their battlefield effects. Likewise, centralised procurement, maintenance and replacement of drones produce economies of scale that allow for the deployment of larger numbers of drones.
The next step is to consider whether there is a place in the current force structure that can fulfil this role, or if there is a need to create a new force element.
My view is that FPV drones are a new and important technology but that the ‘effects’ they deliver already exist and slot easily into the artillery’s existing operational model. For example, artillery already manages a surveillance battle, runs the targeting process, and provides tactical commanders with support integrating indirect fire into plans.
Notably, artillery’s current operational model – sending liaison forward to support decision-making, then managing the movement of indirect fire effects (i.e. artillery fire) forward to support manoeuvre translates easily into managing similar FPV drone effects.
Likewise, the technical and logistical processes that support artillery equipment and the movement of large amounts of ammunition are transferable into managing large numbers of FPV drones. The roles and disciplines of the gun position translate easily into an operational model for forward drone operations.
Rather than trying to ‘re-invent the wheel’ or viewing FPV drones as ‘small helicopters’ dispersed across the force, it makes sense to centralise these resources and take an ‘effects-based’ approach to their management.
The battlefield effects of FPV drones are essentially surveillance and indirect fire, and the existing artillery corps provides a natural home for management of these weapons.
